maybe they did, maybe they didnt - you have no idea and neither do I, however we do know beyond any reasonable doubt that a majority of these people in those areas wanted to rejoin Russia.
All coups are illegal if they fail. If they succeed, then quite often they become legal.
As I said, not really the reason for intervention anyway.
Accurate assessment.
Its hard to boycott when the military police knock at the door with your ballot
Oh, it was a critical turning point and you could argue the start of events that led up to the current war.
they clearly have support in the annexed areas
...they should go with one of 'the squad'.
That'd liven things up!
This was flagged the other week. LSE did some research and the findings identified as you'd expect.
www.lse.ac.uk
most people I interviewed in Crimea saw Russian citizenship as illegal and pointlessThis was flagged the other week. LSE did some research and the findings identified as you'd expect.
Were Crimeans really pro-Russian before annexation?
Vladimir Putin justified his annexation of Crimea in 2014 with the claim that Crimeans were more “Russian” than “Ukrainian”, but what is the reality behind the rhetoric? Eleanor Knott, who conducted fieldwork into issues of identity and citizenship in Crimea before annexation, explains.
15 Nov 2022 • 5 min read
Dr Eleanor Knott
Assistant Professor in Qualitative Methods, Department of Methodology, LSE
When Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014, many pitched annexation as if it was a desirable outcome for Crimea’s residents. After all, weren’t most of Crimea’s residents not only ethnically Russian but also pro-Russian? Weren’t they already Russian citizens?
Russia held a referendum seemingly to demonstrate support for annexation. But referenda do not tell us about how citizens feel or identify, especially when held during an armed occupation by Russian soldiers. My latest book, Kin Majorities, exposes a more complex reality.
Here, I share insights from Kin Majorities based on qualitative fieldwork that I conducted in Crimea prior to annexation. This data, collected during a time of calm, questions what we actually know about the varying identities and preferences of Crimea’s residents, at a time when annexation was inconceivable.
Examining these questions in the wake of Russia’s war against, and invasion of, Ukraine might seem old news. But remembering the circumstances that led Russia to annex Crimea is as important now as ever.
How did Crimea’s residents feel before the war?
My research shows that identity in Crimea was far more complex than a region with a Russian, or pro-Russian, majority. Few in Crimea identified as pro-Russian nationalists. In fact, only those I interviewed within pro-Russian parties and movements identified as such. Instead, many identified as ethnically Russian, but with few cultural or political ties to Russia. Many others identified as between Ukraine and Russia: as Crimean. Meanwhile, many younger people did not identify, ethnically, even as Russian speakers, rather they identified as Ukrainian citizens.
We know we had underestimated the strength of people’s political identification with Ukraine before Russia’s war against Ukraine. Equally, we underestimated Ukraine’s capacity to mobilise citizens. Crimea was considered particularly unlikely to be a region with a community identifying foremost as Ukrainian citizens. Yet, in Kin Majorities I explore how political identification with Ukraine was important for many in Crimea before annexation, especially younger people.
Illegal, pointless and undesirable: a common view of Russian citizenship pre-2014
My book also highlights the fact that Crimea was passportised by Russia after annexation and not before. We know there were pockets of Russian citizens in Sevastopol before annexation – primarily those connected to the military, or military pensioners. But, outside of these pockets, there is little evidence of en masse acquisition of Russian citizenship before 2014.
My research shows that it is likely that Crimea was not passportised by Russia prior to annexation because Crimea’s residents viewed Russian citizenship as inaccessible, undesirable, illegitimate, and illegal.
Only the minority in pro-Russian parties wanted Russian citizenship. They wanted it to provide leverage against Ukraine. But Russian citizenship was not accessible to them. It was illegal by Ukrainian law. And Russia did not seem to facilitate access to Russian citizenship in Crimea – even for those in pro-Russian parties.
Instead, most people I interviewed in Crimea saw Russian citizenship as illegal and pointless. Even if Russian citizenship had been accessible for them, it would still have been undesirable. Russian citizenship failed to offer much in the way of rights they needed or wanted. Instead, they respected Ukraine’s laws where dual citizenship was illegal.
Among those I interviewed, there was also little support for annexation or separatism before 2014. Annexation, or separatism, seemed inconceivable and undesirable.
Instead, most of those I interviewed supported the territorial status quo. They viewed Crimea as a legitimate part of Ukraine and themselves as legitimate citizens of Ukraine.
Most of those I interviewed saw no benefits to annexation or separatism. They preferred the territorial status quo, not because of stability. For them, Crimea was a legitimate part of Ukraine. They identified with Ukraine, not against Ukraine.
Politics of nationalism and identity is not as important as we think
My book reveals that far less in post-Soviet politics boils down to politics of nationalism and identity than we think. Instead, political elites often use identity politics as a veil for their own corruption.
Ukraine’s “party of power” – Party of Regions, led by Viktor Yanukovych – was highly corrupt and used control in Crimea for profit. But pro-Russian political parties in Crimea were also highly corrupt.
As backed up by news sources, interviewees described those involved in pro-Russian politics in Crimea as heavily implicated in corruption and organised crime.
Why were pro-Russian political parties unsuccessful in Crimea?
Pro-Russian political parties were unsuccessful in Crimea for two reasons: first, their ideology failed to appeal. Second, their style of politics, via corruption and organised crime, made these parties illegitimate and unpopular to voters.
However, annexation catapulted pro-Russian politicians – namely Sergei Aksenov – into power because of Russia’s support.
These facts should lead us to question: was annexation more about pro-Russian nationalism or furthering profit from corruption and organised crime?
The violence of the past must be remembered
My final insight is that we must remember the violence wrought by Russian and Crimean authorities against Crimean Tatars. In 1944, Soviet authorities deported the Crimean Tatar community from Crimea under fabricated claims Crimean Tatars were “Nazi collaborators”. Many died while being deported.
Crimean Tatars were only able to return to Crimea in the late 1980s. Since annexation, many Crimean Tatars once again live in exile outside Crimea. Within Crimea, many Crimean Tatars, as well as dissidents, have faced tremendous human rights abuses since annexation, including beatings, intimidation, kidnappings, and murder.
Russia’s war against Ukraine since February 2022 is an opportunity to remember the violence that Russia has wrought against Crimea’s residents, as well as residents of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts since 2014. It is an opportunity to recognise Russia’s continued breaking of international law. It is not a time to forget, but to keep questioning and remembering.
Were Crimeans really pro-Russian before annexation?
Eleanor Knott’s new book "Kin Majorities" explores issues of identity and citizenship in Crimea before annexation by Russia.
They should just go home.Ukraine War Map Shows Zaporizhzhia Gains as Russian Losses Reportedly Spike
Russian losses reportedly "significantly increased" as the Ukrainian counteroffensive found success in the Zaporizhzhia region, according to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).
A report published by ISW on Tuesday highlights the claims of Ukrainian military spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun, who said that the Russian military had lost 313 troops on Monday in western Zaporizhzhia, a significant increase from the approximately 200 troops lost on each of the previous two days. Newsweek has not independently verified losses on either side of the conflict.
ISW suggested that the losses may be due to Russia's use of "Storm-Z" units, which consist of former prisoners. The U.S.-based think tank, which has previously argued that the units are a liability for Moscow "due to poor morale and discipline," said that the prisoners-turned-soldiers would provide only "marginal combat power" in Zaporizhzhia.
"Russian losses have reportedly significantly increased in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast in recent days, and the Russian military likely struggles with a lack of available combat-effective units that the Russian command is willing to laterally redeploy to this sector of the front," the ISW report states.
'Storm-Z' detachments are often combat ineffective and will likely provide the Russian defense in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast with marginal combat power," it continues.
An updated war map included in the ISW report shows the claimed Ukrainian advances on Russian-occupied territory in Zaporizhzhia. ISW said that Ukraine conducted successful offensives in western Zaporizhzhia on Monday and Tuesday.
Geolocated footage published on Monday purportedly shows Ukrainian advances west of the settlement of Verbove, while an attempted Russian advance in western Zaporizhzhia was thwarted by Ukraine on Tuesday.
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In addition to gaining ground in Zaporizhzhia, ISW also reported on Tuesday that Ukraine successfully "advanced along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line."
Newsweek reached out for comment to the Russian Ministry of Defense via email on Tuesday night.
The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine said in a Facebook post on Tuesday that the military "successfully repelled an enemy attack in the vicinity of Robotyne," while adding that Russian forces had "fired artillery and mortars" at over 25 settlements in the region.
The Russian military was also accused of violating "international humanitarian law by forcibly living with civilians in their homes" by the General Staff, with "large numbers" of occupying troops in the Zaporizhzhia settlement of Tokmak allegedly being "housed with elderly civilians in their homes" and "looting the apartments and houses of Ukrainian citizens."
ISW maps published on Monday showed Ukraine's claimed advances in Zaporizhzhia and near the Donetsk region settlement of Bakhmut, where former Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar claimed that 5.1 square kilometers of territory had been retaken over the past week.
The think tank said that Ukraine continued its counteroffensive near Bakhmut on Tuesday "but did not make any confirmed advances," despite "inflicting significant manpower and equipment losses on Russian forces."
This was flagged the other week. LSE did some research and the findings identified as you'd expect.
Were Crimeans really pro-Russian before annexation?
Vladimir Putin justified his annexation of Crimea in 2014 with the claim that Crimeans were more “Russian” than “Ukrainian”, but what is the reality behind the rhetoric? Eleanor Knott, who conducted fieldwork into issues of identity and citizenship in Crimea before annexation, explains.
15 Nov 2022 • 5 min read
Dr Eleanor Knott
Assistant Professor in Qualitative Methods, Department of Methodology, LSE
When Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014, many pitched annexation as if it was a desirable outcome for Crimea’s residents. After all, weren’t most of Crimea’s residents not only ethnically Russian but also pro-Russian? Weren’t they already Russian citizens?
Russia held a referendum seemingly to demonstrate support for annexation. But referenda do not tell us about how citizens feel or identify, especially when held during an armed occupation by Russian soldiers. My latest book, Kin Majorities, exposes a more complex reality.
Here, I share insights from Kin Majorities based on qualitative fieldwork that I conducted in Crimea prior to annexation. This data, collected during a time of calm, questions what we actually know about the varying identities and preferences of Crimea’s residents, at a time when annexation was inconceivable.
Examining these questions in the wake of Russia’s war against, and invasion of, Ukraine might seem old news. But remembering the circumstances that led Russia to annex Crimea is as important now as ever.
How did Crimea’s residents feel before the war?
My research shows that identity in Crimea was far more complex than a region with a Russian, or pro-Russian, majority. Few in Crimea identified as pro-Russian nationalists. In fact, only those I interviewed within pro-Russian parties and movements identified as such. Instead, many identified as ethnically Russian, but with few cultural or political ties to Russia. Many others identified as between Ukraine and Russia: as Crimean. Meanwhile, many younger people did not identify, ethnically, even as Russian speakers, rather they identified as Ukrainian citizens.
We know we had underestimated the strength of people’s political identification with Ukraine before Russia’s war against Ukraine. Equally, we underestimated Ukraine’s capacity to mobilise citizens. Crimea was considered particularly unlikely to be a region with a community identifying foremost as Ukrainian citizens. Yet, in Kin Majorities I explore how political identification with Ukraine was important for many in Crimea before annexation, especially younger people.
Illegal, pointless and undesirable: a common view of Russian citizenship pre-2014
My book also highlights the fact that Crimea was passportised by Russia after annexation and not before. We know there were pockets of Russian citizens in Sevastopol before annexation – primarily those connected to the military, or military pensioners. But, outside of these pockets, there is little evidence of en masse acquisition of Russian citizenship before 2014.
My research shows that it is likely that Crimea was not passportised by Russia prior to annexation because Crimea’s residents viewed Russian citizenship as inaccessible, undesirable, illegitimate, and illegal.
Only the minority in pro-Russian parties wanted Russian citizenship. They wanted it to provide leverage against Ukraine. But Russian citizenship was not accessible to them. It was illegal by Ukrainian law. And Russia did not seem to facilitate access to Russian citizenship in Crimea – even for those in pro-Russian parties.
Instead, most people I interviewed in Crimea saw Russian citizenship as illegal and pointless. Even if Russian citizenship had been accessible for them, it would still have been undesirable. Russian citizenship failed to offer much in the way of rights they needed or wanted. Instead, they respected Ukraine’s laws where dual citizenship was illegal.
Among those I interviewed, there was also little support for annexation or separatism before 2014. Annexation, or separatism, seemed inconceivable and undesirable.
Instead, most of those I interviewed supported the territorial status quo. They viewed Crimea as a legitimate part of Ukraine and themselves as legitimate citizens of Ukraine.
Most of those I interviewed saw no benefits to annexation or separatism. They preferred the territorial status quo, not because of stability. For them, Crimea was a legitimate part of Ukraine. They identified with Ukraine, not against Ukraine.
Politics of nationalism and identity is not as important as we think
My book reveals that far less in post-Soviet politics boils down to politics of nationalism and identity than we think. Instead, political elites often use identity politics as a veil for their own corruption.
Ukraine’s “party of power” – Party of Regions, led by Viktor Yanukovych – was highly corrupt and used control in Crimea for profit. But pro-Russian political parties in Crimea were also highly corrupt.
As backed up by news sources, interviewees described those involved in pro-Russian politics in Crimea as heavily implicated in corruption and organised crime.
Why were pro-Russian political parties unsuccessful in Crimea?
Pro-Russian political parties were unsuccessful in Crimea for two reasons: first, their ideology failed to appeal. Second, their style of politics, via corruption and organised crime, made these parties illegitimate and unpopular to voters.
However, annexation catapulted pro-Russian politicians – namely Sergei Aksenov – into power because of Russia’s support.
These facts should lead us to question: was annexation more about pro-Russian nationalism or furthering profit from corruption and organised crime?
The violence of the past must be remembered
My final insight is that we must remember the violence wrought by Russian and Crimean authorities against Crimean Tatars. In 1944, Soviet authorities deported the Crimean Tatar community from Crimea under fabricated claims Crimean Tatars were “Nazi collaborators”. Many died while being deported.
Crimean Tatars were only able to return to Crimea in the late 1980s. Since annexation, many Crimean Tatars once again live in exile outside Crimea. Within Crimea, many Crimean Tatars, as well as dissidents, have faced tremendous human rights abuses since annexation, including beatings, intimidation, kidnappings, and murder.
Russia’s war against Ukraine since February 2022 is an opportunity to remember the violence that Russia has wrought against Crimea’s residents, as well as residents of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts since 2014. It is an opportunity to recognise Russia’s continued breaking of international law. It is not a time to forget, but to keep questioning and remembering.
Were Crimeans really pro-Russian before annexation?
Eleanor Knott’s new book "Kin Majorities" explores issues of identity and citizenship in Crimea before annexation by Russia.
I don't know.
