BigMick
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Yes I'm aware of Jeff Halper's great work and have total respect for him, even if I don't agree with everything he says - I never do! They have a very good and informative website as well.
Current Affairs Palestinian Elections
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BigMick
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Long post trying to understand Hamas's strategy and the change wrought in it by the cancellation of the elections: An attempt to make some sense of the madness.
Anyone following Gazan (Hamas controlled) media in the days leading up to the election cancellation would have seen criticism and threats to Mahmoud Abbas, with only the usual vague secondary threats to Israel. A couple of days after the cancellation, though, while there was still criticism of Abbas and Fatah - cowards who surrendered Jerusalem to the Israelis etc - the threats were increasingly directed at Israel, culminating in the firing of missiles at the very city they purported to be the protectors of, Jerusalem.
On May 3rd I wrote on here, "Batten down the hatches. May could be a gruesome month." If I could see trouble ahead, I'm sure Shin Bet could as well. However, no-one could predict the extent to which the situation escalated. What went wrong?
The first clue is found in the Hamas leadership election back in March. Incumbent Yahya Sinwar managed to retain his position as leader in Gaza, but only after it had previously been announced that he had been beaten by a Hamas veteran, Nizar Awadallah. Hastily, it was then announced that a 4th round of voting was needed, and this time Sinwar won.
This is important because Hamas is divided into rival camps. One is loyal to Iran and favours continued military confrontations with Israel. The other camp, backed by the organisation's paymasters, Qatar, favours a more pragmatic approach. Sinwar is in the latter camp, while Awadallah is in the former, and is also a close associate of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh. Sinwar's dubious election victory showed that support for the two conflicting wings were evenly matched.
The militarists never went along with Sinwar's tactical decision to agree to an unofficial ceasefire with Israel, which only broke down last month, and also accused him of being too close to Egypt at the expense of ties with Iran. Hamas military wing, which he once headed, were also opposed to his pragmatic approach in accepting, temporarily and purely for tactical reasons, a two-state solution.
This was the strategy of Sinwar and his supporters.
1. Agree terms with Fatah to hold elections. This involved several concessions to Fatah.
2. Agree with Fatah that no matter what the result of the election a unity coalition government would be formed with no Hamas figure in senior positions.
3. Being part of a unity PA government would put pressure on Israel and Egypt to lift the blockade on Gaza.
4. Use the elections to gain admittance to the PLO, an organisation that Hamas has always opposed. This was important because the PLO is internationally recognised as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people”. This would allow Hamas greater influence and legitimacy within the Palestinian national movement.
5. Being part of a successful unity government would enable Hamas to re-engage with Europe, to end the EU’s no-contact policy, and to be delisted as a terrorist organisation.
6. Take advantage of Fatah's disunity to eventually become the major party in both Gaza and the West Bank.
The pragmatists hoped that a successful electoral process would demonstrate to all of Hamas that political participation and commitment to democratic principles can generate benefits that it cannot obtain through armed violence.
Unfortunately, everything changed when the elections were cancelled. Sinwar has disappeared, even before the first missile was fired. Normally, with his fiery rhetoric style, he is front and centre at such critical times, but recently he has not been seen, and more importantly not a single statement has been issued by him or on his behalf. Instead it has been hardliners like Khaled Mishaal, Haniyeh and Fathi Hamad who have been centre-stage.
It could be that Sinwar has simply taken a step back to allow others to do the dirty work, waiting to re-emerge as 'the voice of reason' when the time for peace comes. It's more likely, though, that for the time being at least he has lost the power struggle and the hard-line militarists are in charge.
A clue may be found in the fact that there was a rare public statement from Mohammed Deif, head of Hamas armed brigade and a fierce rival of Sinwar. Deif has not been seen in public for many years and public statements from him are almost as rare. But the day after the Hamas infiltrated crowd had chanted his name at the al-Aqsa Mosque - numerous other Hamas leaders, past and present, were similarly worshipped, but not Sinwar - he issued a statement saying Israel would 'pay a heavy price' if the evictions in Sheikh Jarrah went ahead. On television his message was read out against a backdrop of a silhouetted figure in front of a video of missiles being launched and exploding. Haniyeh also appeared on TV from his home in Qatar, sitting in front of a video showing the military in action while reading out a list of demands he'd sent to Netanyahu.
In the days following the election cancellation Hamas began using various Jerusalem issues to promote their cause at the expense of Fatah. Their operatives in the West Bank and Israel were urged to go to Jerusalem, in the knowledge that as a terrorist organisation their presence was bound to attract the attention of the notoriously brutal and stupid Israeli police, commanded by a new, inexperienced police chief. For the first time Hamas flags began to appear at the Sheihk Jarrah protests, and shortly after at the al-Aqsa Mosque. A drive-by shooting on the West Bank which saw three Jewish students shot, with one killed, was hailed as a heroic act and similar attacks were encouraged.
So why did the hardliners in Hamas start a bombing campaign in the knowledge that it could never win? Impossible to know and I've no desire to get inside the heads of terrorists, but there are three possible scenarios.
In the first one, they anticipated that Israel would strike back hard, as they have done.
Hamas would use the conflict to portray themselves as the only organisation fighting the occupation, while trying to incite an intifada on the West Bank and encourage intercommunal violence within Israel, something they've long advocated. That way they could replace Fatah as the major party in Palestine, without needing an election. It's also possible they hoped that the much more powerful Hezbollah would open a separate front by attacking from the north; after all, only two years ago Hamas promised to do the same for Hezbollah if they chose to attack Israel.
Apparently, they've already let it be known diplomatically that they would be willing to end the conflict, but only if Israel gives in to their demands:
1. Israel 'pullout' from the al-Asa Mosque compound.
2. No eviction of Sheikh Jarrah families.
3. Release of those detained by Israel in past few weeks.
4. Cessation of Israeli military strikes on the Gaza Strip.
Israel acceding to those demands would enable Hamas to declare themselves victors and the true defenders of Jerusalem, no matter how many of their citizens have been killed or how much of Gaza has been laid to waste.
The second scenario is very different, and involves them misjudging the Israeli response.
In April, opinion polls came out which showed Hamas doing very badly both in Gaza and the West Bank. Their response was to launch around 45 missiles towards Israel over a period of 5 nights, 9 of which failed to clear the border, though no deaths were reported in the media. Most of the ones that reached Israel were shot down by the Iron Dome, while others fell in rural areas with only minor damage to a few buildings.
The first two nights Israel responded as they always do, and as Hamas would have expected, by targeting missile launching sites and arms dumps - all of which had been emptied by Hamas. But then something unheard of happened: on the 3rd night and thereafter Israel didn't respond other than to close the coastal Gazan fishing zone. At the same time they contacted mediators Egypt and the Hamas leadership directly to say they didn't want an escalation. The Hamas bombs ceased, the fishing zone reopened and life went on as before. Why did the Israelis respond so meekly? They had a political vacuum at home following their inconclusive election just a few days earlier; they were involved in a potentially dangerous dispute with Iran; and they didn't want to interfere in the Palestinian elections by allowing Hamas to paint themselves as the victims of Israeli aggression, which they had already begun to do, thus gathering much-needed support for the elections.
Following the cancellation of the elections the hardliners took over and misread the Israeli thinking, in particular the third point above, which of course no longer applied. Therefore they felt free to urge their operatives and supporters from the West Bank and from within Israel to converge on Jerusalem and the al-Aqsa Mosque. Deif and Haniyah felt free to issue their absurd demands. And then fatally they felt free to follow through with their threats and fire missiles at Jerusalem. The missiles, they thought, would be shot down by the Iron Dome, Israel would retaliate by hitting their usual targets, and that would be the end of it. Israel would again not want to escalate the situation and Hamas could continue to portray themselves as the defenders of Jerusalem, in contrast to the cowardly Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah.
They were wrong; the situation rapidly spiralled out of control.
The third scenario is the most frightening but possibly the least likely: that Hamas are fighting this war in a co-ordinated action with Iran and their proxy Hezbollah, testing out Israel's defence capabilities with a view to a Hezbollah attack in the near future. Certainly Iran have provided weaponry and tactical advice to Hamas, and the leader of the IRGC's Quds Force, Esmail Ghaani, has spoken to the leadership in recent days. Would Hamas start a war they couldn't win, a war that could only result in inestimable damage to Gaza and terrible suffering to its people, at the behest of Iran? The militarists probably would.
Whichever scenario is true, there are no winners in this conflict. Israel might defeat them but the Islamist movement, while not supported by the majority of Palestinians, will re-emerge and meanwhile the fault lines in their own society are being laid bare for all to see. Ultimately, it's not the leaders or decision-makers who pay the price for this lunacy but the long-suffering people of Gaza and innocent Israelis, both Jews and Arabs.
Anyone following Gazan (Hamas controlled) media in the days leading up to the election cancellation would have seen criticism and threats to Mahmoud Abbas, with only the usual vague secondary threats to Israel. A couple of days after the cancellation, though, while there was still criticism of Abbas and Fatah - cowards who surrendered Jerusalem to the Israelis etc - the threats were increasingly directed at Israel, culminating in the firing of missiles at the very city they purported to be the protectors of, Jerusalem.
On May 3rd I wrote on here, "Batten down the hatches. May could be a gruesome month." If I could see trouble ahead, I'm sure Shin Bet could as well. However, no-one could predict the extent to which the situation escalated. What went wrong?
The first clue is found in the Hamas leadership election back in March. Incumbent Yahya Sinwar managed to retain his position as leader in Gaza, but only after it had previously been announced that he had been beaten by a Hamas veteran, Nizar Awadallah. Hastily, it was then announced that a 4th round of voting was needed, and this time Sinwar won.
This is important because Hamas is divided into rival camps. One is loyal to Iran and favours continued military confrontations with Israel. The other camp, backed by the organisation's paymasters, Qatar, favours a more pragmatic approach. Sinwar is in the latter camp, while Awadallah is in the former, and is also a close associate of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh. Sinwar's dubious election victory showed that support for the two conflicting wings were evenly matched.
The militarists never went along with Sinwar's tactical decision to agree to an unofficial ceasefire with Israel, which only broke down last month, and also accused him of being too close to Egypt at the expense of ties with Iran. Hamas military wing, which he once headed, were also opposed to his pragmatic approach in accepting, temporarily and purely for tactical reasons, a two-state solution.
This was the strategy of Sinwar and his supporters.
1. Agree terms with Fatah to hold elections. This involved several concessions to Fatah.
2. Agree with Fatah that no matter what the result of the election a unity coalition government would be formed with no Hamas figure in senior positions.
3. Being part of a unity PA government would put pressure on Israel and Egypt to lift the blockade on Gaza.
4. Use the elections to gain admittance to the PLO, an organisation that Hamas has always opposed. This was important because the PLO is internationally recognised as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people”. This would allow Hamas greater influence and legitimacy within the Palestinian national movement.
5. Being part of a successful unity government would enable Hamas to re-engage with Europe, to end the EU’s no-contact policy, and to be delisted as a terrorist organisation.
6. Take advantage of Fatah's disunity to eventually become the major party in both Gaza and the West Bank.
The pragmatists hoped that a successful electoral process would demonstrate to all of Hamas that political participation and commitment to democratic principles can generate benefits that it cannot obtain through armed violence.
Unfortunately, everything changed when the elections were cancelled. Sinwar has disappeared, even before the first missile was fired. Normally, with his fiery rhetoric style, he is front and centre at such critical times, but recently he has not been seen, and more importantly not a single statement has been issued by him or on his behalf. Instead it has been hardliners like Khaled Mishaal, Haniyeh and Fathi Hamad who have been centre-stage.
It could be that Sinwar has simply taken a step back to allow others to do the dirty work, waiting to re-emerge as 'the voice of reason' when the time for peace comes. It's more likely, though, that for the time being at least he has lost the power struggle and the hard-line militarists are in charge.
A clue may be found in the fact that there was a rare public statement from Mohammed Deif, head of Hamas armed brigade and a fierce rival of Sinwar. Deif has not been seen in public for many years and public statements from him are almost as rare. But the day after the Hamas infiltrated crowd had chanted his name at the al-Aqsa Mosque - numerous other Hamas leaders, past and present, were similarly worshipped, but not Sinwar - he issued a statement saying Israel would 'pay a heavy price' if the evictions in Sheikh Jarrah went ahead. On television his message was read out against a backdrop of a silhouetted figure in front of a video of missiles being launched and exploding. Haniyeh also appeared on TV from his home in Qatar, sitting in front of a video showing the military in action while reading out a list of demands he'd sent to Netanyahu.
In the days following the election cancellation Hamas began using various Jerusalem issues to promote their cause at the expense of Fatah. Their operatives in the West Bank and Israel were urged to go to Jerusalem, in the knowledge that as a terrorist organisation their presence was bound to attract the attention of the notoriously brutal and stupid Israeli police, commanded by a new, inexperienced police chief. For the first time Hamas flags began to appear at the Sheihk Jarrah protests, and shortly after at the al-Aqsa Mosque. A drive-by shooting on the West Bank which saw three Jewish students shot, with one killed, was hailed as a heroic act and similar attacks were encouraged.
So why did the hardliners in Hamas start a bombing campaign in the knowledge that it could never win? Impossible to know and I've no desire to get inside the heads of terrorists, but there are three possible scenarios.
In the first one, they anticipated that Israel would strike back hard, as they have done.
Hamas would use the conflict to portray themselves as the only organisation fighting the occupation, while trying to incite an intifada on the West Bank and encourage intercommunal violence within Israel, something they've long advocated. That way they could replace Fatah as the major party in Palestine, without needing an election. It's also possible they hoped that the much more powerful Hezbollah would open a separate front by attacking from the north; after all, only two years ago Hamas promised to do the same for Hezbollah if they chose to attack Israel.
Apparently, they've already let it be known diplomatically that they would be willing to end the conflict, but only if Israel gives in to their demands:
1. Israel 'pullout' from the al-Asa Mosque compound.
2. No eviction of Sheikh Jarrah families.
3. Release of those detained by Israel in past few weeks.
4. Cessation of Israeli military strikes on the Gaza Strip.
Israel acceding to those demands would enable Hamas to declare themselves victors and the true defenders of Jerusalem, no matter how many of their citizens have been killed or how much of Gaza has been laid to waste.
The second scenario is very different, and involves them misjudging the Israeli response.
In April, opinion polls came out which showed Hamas doing very badly both in Gaza and the West Bank. Their response was to launch around 45 missiles towards Israel over a period of 5 nights, 9 of which failed to clear the border, though no deaths were reported in the media. Most of the ones that reached Israel were shot down by the Iron Dome, while others fell in rural areas with only minor damage to a few buildings.
The first two nights Israel responded as they always do, and as Hamas would have expected, by targeting missile launching sites and arms dumps - all of which had been emptied by Hamas. But then something unheard of happened: on the 3rd night and thereafter Israel didn't respond other than to close the coastal Gazan fishing zone. At the same time they contacted mediators Egypt and the Hamas leadership directly to say they didn't want an escalation. The Hamas bombs ceased, the fishing zone reopened and life went on as before. Why did the Israelis respond so meekly? They had a political vacuum at home following their inconclusive election just a few days earlier; they were involved in a potentially dangerous dispute with Iran; and they didn't want to interfere in the Palestinian elections by allowing Hamas to paint themselves as the victims of Israeli aggression, which they had already begun to do, thus gathering much-needed support for the elections.
Following the cancellation of the elections the hardliners took over and misread the Israeli thinking, in particular the third point above, which of course no longer applied. Therefore they felt free to urge their operatives and supporters from the West Bank and from within Israel to converge on Jerusalem and the al-Aqsa Mosque. Deif and Haniyah felt free to issue their absurd demands. And then fatally they felt free to follow through with their threats and fire missiles at Jerusalem. The missiles, they thought, would be shot down by the Iron Dome, Israel would retaliate by hitting their usual targets, and that would be the end of it. Israel would again not want to escalate the situation and Hamas could continue to portray themselves as the defenders of Jerusalem, in contrast to the cowardly Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah.
They were wrong; the situation rapidly spiralled out of control.
The third scenario is the most frightening but possibly the least likely: that Hamas are fighting this war in a co-ordinated action with Iran and their proxy Hezbollah, testing out Israel's defence capabilities with a view to a Hezbollah attack in the near future. Certainly Iran have provided weaponry and tactical advice to Hamas, and the leader of the IRGC's Quds Force, Esmail Ghaani, has spoken to the leadership in recent days. Would Hamas start a war they couldn't win, a war that could only result in inestimable damage to Gaza and terrible suffering to its people, at the behest of Iran? The militarists probably would.
Whichever scenario is true, there are no winners in this conflict. Israel might defeat them but the Islamist movement, while not supported by the majority of Palestinians, will re-emerge and meanwhile the fault lines in their own society are being laid bare for all to see. Ultimately, it's not the leaders or decision-makers who pay the price for this lunacy but the long-suffering people of Gaza and innocent Israelis, both Jews and Arabs.
BigMick
Player Valuation: £20m
In an interesting development (at least to me!), the United Arab Emirates has warned Hamas that its planned investments in the Gaza Strip may not move forward if the terror group does not maintain calm in the territory.
In the wake of the Abraham Accords, the UAE has in recent months been in constant touch with Hamas about various potential infrastructure projects to improve the lives of residents, and has already started and invested in several infrastructure projects in the Gaza region. However, several of the projects are being adversely affected by the conflict.
“We are still ready and willing to promote civil projects in cooperation with the Palestinian Authority and under UN management in Gaza, but our necessary condition is calm,” a senior official said.
“If Hamas does not commit to complete calm, it is dooming the residents of the Strip to a life of suffering. Its leaders must understand that their policies are first and foremost hurting the people of Gaza,”
What makes this even more intriguing is that one of the chief advisers to Prince Mohammad bin Zayed is none other than the Gazan-born Mohammed Dahlan, who set up his own party to run in the now abandoned elections, forging contacts with Hamas in the process. His party, The Future, was doing well in the opinion polls, even beating Hamas in the last authoritative poll before the cancellation. He was also considering a run at the presidency against his arch-rival, Mahmoud Abbas.
If Dahlan has had a hand in issuing this warning to Hamas, which seems likely, he becomes the first serious Palestinian politician to have the courage to publicly criticise their campaign, however cryptically it's been done. I'm sure Hamas have got the message, but whether they could care less is another matter, especially with Iran whispering in their ear.
For a brief (as possible) profile of the controversial Mr. Dahlan see my post of March 23rd.
In the wake of the Abraham Accords, the UAE has in recent months been in constant touch with Hamas about various potential infrastructure projects to improve the lives of residents, and has already started and invested in several infrastructure projects in the Gaza region. However, several of the projects are being adversely affected by the conflict.
“We are still ready and willing to promote civil projects in cooperation with the Palestinian Authority and under UN management in Gaza, but our necessary condition is calm,” a senior official said.
“If Hamas does not commit to complete calm, it is dooming the residents of the Strip to a life of suffering. Its leaders must understand that their policies are first and foremost hurting the people of Gaza,”
What makes this even more intriguing is that one of the chief advisers to Prince Mohammad bin Zayed is none other than the Gazan-born Mohammed Dahlan, who set up his own party to run in the now abandoned elections, forging contacts with Hamas in the process. His party, The Future, was doing well in the opinion polls, even beating Hamas in the last authoritative poll before the cancellation. He was also considering a run at the presidency against his arch-rival, Mahmoud Abbas.
If Dahlan has had a hand in issuing this warning to Hamas, which seems likely, he becomes the first serious Palestinian politician to have the courage to publicly criticise their campaign, however cryptically it's been done. I'm sure Hamas have got the message, but whether they could care less is another matter, especially with Iran whispering in their ear.
For a brief (as possible) profile of the controversial Mr. Dahlan see my post of March 23rd.
peteblue
Welcome back Wayne
Iran likes fighting proxy wars....
BigMick
Player Valuation: £20m
Yes - Shia militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Gaza.
Toffeeslam
Player Valuation: £40m
Dahlan Is despised in the West Bank where most Palestinians live. it’s why he never returned because he couldn’t do it without Israeli protection.
PA are weak and corrupt and that is down to themselves as being corrupt and it’s also exactly the way the Israeli’s like it. A divided leadership is the perfect excuse to perpetuate the occupation and use it as a reason saying there is no one to negotiate with.
Hamas need to be eliminated and for that to happen someone needs to reign in the Israelis and no one wants to do that hence it’s more than a local issue it’s a global one.
BigMick
Player Valuation: £20m
Never thought I'd say it but good article here in the Britsh media.
www.newstatesman.com
Couple of things I disagree with but get's most things right.
What the postponed Palestinian elections mean for the conflict with Israel
The delay to elections threatens an eruption of violence among rival Palestinian factions vying for control.
www.newstatesman.com
Couple of things I disagree with but get's most things right.
BigMick
Player Valuation: £20m
Thanks for your post - that last bit was certainly thought provoking!
Regarding Dahlan, despised by many, yes, mainly due to the propaganda campaign mounted against him for many years by erstwhile friend and now sworn enemy, Mahmoud Abbas and his cronies, culminating in the allegation that Dahlan assassinated Arafat! Despite this he does have some support in the West Bank, especially in refugee camps, although many of his supporters have been arrested by the PA. The reason why he's never returned is that the PA have said he would be arrested. Given that during his time as the PA's head of security in Gaza he was known as 'the hammer of Hamas' but has since reached an accommodation with them I wouldn't underestimate him!
Your're right about the PA being corrupt, of course, and about the divided leadership giving Israel an easy excuse not to negotiate. I don't agree, though, that the corruption is the reason for the divided leadership, if that's what you're implying. Hamas have their fair share of multi-millionaire leaders living in their villas in Qatar, Turkey etc.
Regarding Hamas, not sure what you mean by 'eliminate' them, but along with Islamic Jihad and their armed militias, they provide Israel with another excuse for not entering negotiations, and encourage the US, EU and other interested parties to support maintaining the status quo.
BigMick
Player Valuation: £20m
I notice the BBC have featured the comments of Hamas official Moussa Abu Marzouk on their website, uttering some welcome words:
'"I think that the ongoing efforts regarding the ceasefire will succeed," the Hamas political official, Moussa Abu Marzouk, told Lebanon's al-Mayadeen TV.
"I expect a ceasefire to be reached within a day or two, and the ceasefire will be on the basis of mutual agreement."'
Here's a bit more about Mr Marzouk. He's known as Hamas's financial wizard, being responsible for most of the organisations fundraising activities throughout the world, including money collected by charities which end up in the coffers of Hamas. He has lived in various countries and at the moment is believed to have homes in Qatar and Egypt.
He was twice deported from Jordan for links with the Muslim Brotherhood.
In the early 1990s he began a fundraising campaign in the US among wealthy Muslims, while at the same time founding several banking enterprises. He himself became a conglomerate of 10 financial enterprises giving loans and making financial investments.
In 1995 he was arrested in the US on charges of supporting terrorism. After he spent two years in a US prison, it was decided to expel him without trial. In 2001, in the investigation of the 9/11 terrorist attack, it was discovered that he had extensive financial connections with Al Qaeda, including the transfer of funds to the 21 Al Qaeda operatives accused of the attacks.
Naturally, a fair chunk of the money Mr Marzouk handles finds its way into his pockets: Arab sources estimate his wealth at $2-3 billion, making him probably the second most wealthy member of the Hamas leadership.
The BBC didn't give any more of the interview, so missed the bit where he expressed his hope that contacts would be renewed with President Mahmoud Abbas on the basis of "where the Palestinian people are now in in terms of revolution in the face of the occupier."
He continued: "We do not want any disruption in the relationship between us and our brothers in Fatah," noting that "Fatah and Hamas men are involved in clashes with settlers and the occupation army in the West Bank."
That last sentence is revealing in that it's the first public admission that I've seen that Hamas operatives are at the heart of much of the trouble in the West Bank - although the green flags are a bit of a giveaway - just as they were urged to be in the days following the cancellation of the elections as Hamas sought to incite a 3rd intifada. The Fatah men he refers to are likely members of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, which has atrophied in recent years after clashes with PA security forces in 2016. There are suggestions that they've been using the current trouble as a recruitment campaign amongst the angry and frustrated youth.
Marzouk was one of the chief negotiators of the Hamas/Fatah agreement to hold the elections. It could be his comments are the first signs of an attempted reconciliation with the 'coward', 'traitor', 'betrayer of Jerusalem' Mahmoud Abbas, to quote three of the more polite epithets they gave him.
'"I think that the ongoing efforts regarding the ceasefire will succeed," the Hamas political official, Moussa Abu Marzouk, told Lebanon's al-Mayadeen TV.
"I expect a ceasefire to be reached within a day or two, and the ceasefire will be on the basis of mutual agreement."'
Here's a bit more about Mr Marzouk. He's known as Hamas's financial wizard, being responsible for most of the organisations fundraising activities throughout the world, including money collected by charities which end up in the coffers of Hamas. He has lived in various countries and at the moment is believed to have homes in Qatar and Egypt.
He was twice deported from Jordan for links with the Muslim Brotherhood.
In the early 1990s he began a fundraising campaign in the US among wealthy Muslims, while at the same time founding several banking enterprises. He himself became a conglomerate of 10 financial enterprises giving loans and making financial investments.
In 1995 he was arrested in the US on charges of supporting terrorism. After he spent two years in a US prison, it was decided to expel him without trial. In 2001, in the investigation of the 9/11 terrorist attack, it was discovered that he had extensive financial connections with Al Qaeda, including the transfer of funds to the 21 Al Qaeda operatives accused of the attacks.
Naturally, a fair chunk of the money Mr Marzouk handles finds its way into his pockets: Arab sources estimate his wealth at $2-3 billion, making him probably the second most wealthy member of the Hamas leadership.
The BBC didn't give any more of the interview, so missed the bit where he expressed his hope that contacts would be renewed with President Mahmoud Abbas on the basis of "where the Palestinian people are now in in terms of revolution in the face of the occupier."
He continued: "We do not want any disruption in the relationship between us and our brothers in Fatah," noting that "Fatah and Hamas men are involved in clashes with settlers and the occupation army in the West Bank."
That last sentence is revealing in that it's the first public admission that I've seen that Hamas operatives are at the heart of much of the trouble in the West Bank - although the green flags are a bit of a giveaway - just as they were urged to be in the days following the cancellation of the elections as Hamas sought to incite a 3rd intifada. The Fatah men he refers to are likely members of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, which has atrophied in recent years after clashes with PA security forces in 2016. There are suggestions that they've been using the current trouble as a recruitment campaign amongst the angry and frustrated youth.
Marzouk was one of the chief negotiators of the Hamas/Fatah agreement to hold the elections. It could be his comments are the first signs of an attempted reconciliation with the 'coward', 'traitor', 'betrayer of Jerusalem' Mahmoud Abbas, to quote three of the more polite epithets they gave him.
Hamas is something of an odd one out in that equation, being Sunni.
BigMick
Player Valuation: £20m
I know, it seems strange on the face of it. I suppose it says a lot about their ambitions in the region and the ongoing 'shadow war' between Israel and Iran.
BigMick
Player Valuation: £20m
Exhausted today. The adrenaline that must have been coursing through my veins for the last 20 or so days - since the build up to the conflict began - has dissipated with the announcement of the ceasefire. My wife is the same; she's been weeping for most of this morning. Not that this crisis is yet over, of course, and there could yet be more ugly scenes in the West Bank and in Israel.
Here are some ideas on what could or should happen immediately or in the near future. Longer term problems and suggestions for solutions can wait for another day.
1. Emergency aid to Gaza, restoration of essential services.
2. Rebuilding Gaza. This can not be left in the hands of Hamas or a UN/Hamas combination: the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism of 2014 descended into farce. Money will again be siphoned off, rebuilding projects left unfinished, while Hamas stockpile more arms and rebuild their tunnels. Qatar will no doubt be involved but must must not be allowed to simply give money to Hamas. The UAE may be keen, especially given the influence of Gazan politician Mohammed Dahlan, and other Gulf states will again contribute. The US need to be involved and the EU as well, but the key thing is the rebuilding has to be closely monitored from start to finish.
3. In Israel a new government needs to be formed as soon as possible. Ideally the anti-Netanyahu bloc will get its act together, but whoever is PM the government must include Mansour Abbas, the only Israeli politician to show any leadership qualities in the last 6 months, let alone the last fortnight. It's crucial that he is listened to and his ideas implemented speedily, given the short life span of recent Israeli governments. If Abbas achieves nothing it would set back Arab participation in government for years. Because of that the various Arab communities should also be consulted - although they have a responsibility to approach any talks with a positive mindset rather than being cowed by criticism from vociferous hardliners. It would be good to see other Arab political parties join the government but I won't be holding my breath.
4. The Israeli Chief of Police and the Jerusalem Chief of Police should resign/be sacked. For obvious reasons.
5. The Sheikh Jarrah verdict is due soon. It's difficult to see how the decision can overrule all the other court decisions which have gone against the families but maybe a loophole can be found. I've already stated my solution that the Israeli government should expropriate the land and retain it or hand it over to the families as a goodwill gesture, while paying generous compensation to the American settler organisation who currently own it in recompense for the land and unpaid rent. I've no idea whether that is legally possible or whether the American organisation would accept it. It would not go down well with the extreme right and has been made more difficult by Hamas publicly demanding such an outcome or else they will resume firing missiles, but the Israeli government has to be strong enough to rise above such nonsense.
5. While it's impossible at the moment, the Palestinian elections have to reinstated as soon as possible. The people's despair, disillusionment, and anger cannot be allowed to fester. They deserve to have a unified, authoritative government. Joe Biden's decision to agree to their cancellation has proved to be as disastrous as it was shameful.
6. The international community cannot allow the situation in Gaza to revert to what is was before. They can no longer turn a blind eye to Hamas's misrule of Gaza. They cannot continue to allow an internationally recognised terrorist organisation that is bent on the destruction of its neighbour to go on stockpiling arms in preparation for the next attack. A strategy has to be found to deal with them, something made all the more difficult by the cancellation of the elections and the latest conflict.
Here are some ideas on what could or should happen immediately or in the near future. Longer term problems and suggestions for solutions can wait for another day.
1. Emergency aid to Gaza, restoration of essential services.
2. Rebuilding Gaza. This can not be left in the hands of Hamas or a UN/Hamas combination: the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism of 2014 descended into farce. Money will again be siphoned off, rebuilding projects left unfinished, while Hamas stockpile more arms and rebuild their tunnels. Qatar will no doubt be involved but must must not be allowed to simply give money to Hamas. The UAE may be keen, especially given the influence of Gazan politician Mohammed Dahlan, and other Gulf states will again contribute. The US need to be involved and the EU as well, but the key thing is the rebuilding has to be closely monitored from start to finish.
3. In Israel a new government needs to be formed as soon as possible. Ideally the anti-Netanyahu bloc will get its act together, but whoever is PM the government must include Mansour Abbas, the only Israeli politician to show any leadership qualities in the last 6 months, let alone the last fortnight. It's crucial that he is listened to and his ideas implemented speedily, given the short life span of recent Israeli governments. If Abbas achieves nothing it would set back Arab participation in government for years. Because of that the various Arab communities should also be consulted - although they have a responsibility to approach any talks with a positive mindset rather than being cowed by criticism from vociferous hardliners. It would be good to see other Arab political parties join the government but I won't be holding my breath.
4. The Israeli Chief of Police and the Jerusalem Chief of Police should resign/be sacked. For obvious reasons.
5. The Sheikh Jarrah verdict is due soon. It's difficult to see how the decision can overrule all the other court decisions which have gone against the families but maybe a loophole can be found. I've already stated my solution that the Israeli government should expropriate the land and retain it or hand it over to the families as a goodwill gesture, while paying generous compensation to the American settler organisation who currently own it in recompense for the land and unpaid rent. I've no idea whether that is legally possible or whether the American organisation would accept it. It would not go down well with the extreme right and has been made more difficult by Hamas publicly demanding such an outcome or else they will resume firing missiles, but the Israeli government has to be strong enough to rise above such nonsense.
5. While it's impossible at the moment, the Palestinian elections have to reinstated as soon as possible. The people's despair, disillusionment, and anger cannot be allowed to fester. They deserve to have a unified, authoritative government. Joe Biden's decision to agree to their cancellation has proved to be as disastrous as it was shameful.
6. The international community cannot allow the situation in Gaza to revert to what is was before. They can no longer turn a blind eye to Hamas's misrule of Gaza. They cannot continue to allow an internationally recognised terrorist organisation that is bent on the destruction of its neighbour to go on stockpiling arms in preparation for the next attack. A strategy has to be found to deal with them, something made all the more difficult by the cancellation of the elections and the latest conflict.
Toffeeslam
Player Valuation: £40m
I would also add that the international community needs to hold both the Hamas and the Israelis to account for the situation we are in. At the moment I only see condemnation of one side from the western world (I.e Europe and the USA) and whilst this imbalance continues we cannot move forward.
This means Hamas either recognised Israel’s right to exist or they have to be removed. For the Israelis part settlement activities need to cease and also in many cases reversed and apartheid-like policies halted or sanctions are placed.
Elections must be held for the Palestinians and both sides and have to drop maximumist positions to achieve a long lasting and durable peace.
At the moment we have the wrong set of people in charge on BOTH sides of this conflict.
BigMick
Player Valuation: £20m
I agree with most of that. Fingers crossed, I'll write a bit about possible long-term solutions next week, while trying not to get bogged down with too much detail!
BigMick
Player Valuation: £20m
Today should have been the day of the Palestinian Legislative Council elections.
The first election since 2006.
93% of the eligible population took the trouble to register to vote.
36 lists (parties) were competing.
1,381 candidates were nominated for the 132 seats in the legislature.
405 women were nominated - 29% of the candidates.
A unified coalition government, which would have included Hamas but with no-one from them in a major position, was guaranteed.
Democracy.
NO Missiles. NO war. NO deaths.
Gaza not in ruins.
The first step to peace.
Mahmoud Abbas's decision to cancel and to try to pin the blame on Israel fooled hardly anyone, but allowed Hamas to label him a coward and traitor and to portray themselves a the only defenders of Jerusalem. With disastrous consequences for everyone.
The first election since 2006.
93% of the eligible population took the trouble to register to vote.
36 lists (parties) were competing.
1,381 candidates were nominated for the 132 seats in the legislature.
405 women were nominated - 29% of the candidates.
A unified coalition government, which would have included Hamas but with no-one from them in a major position, was guaranteed.
Democracy.
NO Missiles. NO war. NO deaths.
Gaza not in ruins.
The first step to peace.
Mahmoud Abbas's decision to cancel and to try to pin the blame on Israel fooled hardly anyone, but allowed Hamas to label him a coward and traitor and to portray themselves a the only defenders of Jerusalem. With disastrous consequences for everyone.
- Status