Current Affairs Ukraine

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Seeing from a lot of places that negotiations have collapsed

Is anything else expected? What negotiations? You mean someone thought Putin would actually agree to anything other than Ukraine giving up part of its country, removing its military, and allowing Putin to install a puppet state?

There are no negotiations, Putin has no interest and is purely doing it to buy extra time and manipulate the few who still believe some of the things he says.
 
It almost feels like they're daring Russia to have a go at them (knowing they'll have enough security to deal with it) so there's an excuse to get Nato fully involved. I can't imagine its a unanimous decision not to. I hope they don't succeed
Ukraine absolutely, and desperately wants NATO involvement, if nothing else to strengthen their hand at the conference table. I am more skeptical about the Polish, Czech and Slovenian governments. Poland has every reason to want the strongest possible NATO commitment to defend NATO territory, and to escalate short of WMD exchange as a consequence. That's the hand that they've been playing up until now, though I don't know how committed they are to that approach. The Czechs and Slovenians have a better dirt situation, and I have a hard time seeing them as provocateurs. Someone like @Bruce Wayne might be able to weigh in on the situation on the ground in Czechia, and prove me wrong at least in terms of the immediate politics.

but why would a long term separatist conflict suit his aims in Georgia but not Ukraine?
and why would he think he could easily take the whole of Ukraine but not Georgia?
and what are the different strategic objectives?

As far as I can see they are two nearly identical situations and the big difference seems to be passion. Putin wants all of Ukraine because he sees it as fundamental to the Russian empire. Georgia, not so much.
The fact that he's gone all out here and not in Georgia, for me, negates his argument about NATO and security. He could have had the exact same strategic outcome but instead he went all in.
He didn't end up with a long-term separatist conflict in Georgia, though. He forced Georgia to accede to letting go of his sympathizers and walked. He more easily could have taken much of Georgia if he really wanted. I wouldn't have wanted to pacify an insurgency there either, though. Trying to dig insurgents out of the Caucasus is just asking for trouble. See: eastern Afghanistan and its own mountain range that the British, Soviets and United States all broke their teeth on.

In the case of Ukraine, the dirt is more favorable from an attacker's perspective but they have 10x the people. This necessitates a lot more boots to pacify an insurgency, and other posters have highlighted some of the evidence from over the years that despite internal divisions, the Ukrainians respond strongly to threats to their identity and circle up the wagons when those threats occur. Sure, some of that evidence might be a clip from Seinfeld, but the clip is believable (and funny), which is the point. If the clip weren't believable, it would tell us something about who they are.

What Putin probably wants in Ukrainian politics is influence, more than the dirt. Reality is that Ukraine has made a decent chunk of Russian natural gas exports from pipelines crossing their territory vanish over the years. The dirt would also be as good as it gets from the perspective of NATO launching disabling counterforce missile strikes against his land-based forces. From his perspective, these are the threats.

The narrative seems to be that Putin went into Ukraine whole-hog because of the cultural linkages, and thought that he would be welcomed with open arms, but I think that's wrong. I think he went in as hard as he did because of the stakes. I don't think he expected to be welcomed, but I also think he believed he could project more hard power than it turned out he could. I think he expected to roll up the dirt east of the Dnieper fairly easily, and produce a failed state incapable of joining NATO while driving a hard bargain for peace.

You are, of course, welcome to dispute the non-factual portions of that argument. It's my assessment. It doesn't mean I'm right. I'm no expert on Ukrainian or Russian politics. I know an awful lot about the system more broadly, but I won't presume to claim area specialty. To use a poker analogy, I can put Putin on a range based on the available information. I can't necessarily put him on a hand.
 
It almost feels like they're daring Russia to have a go at them (knowing they'll have enough security to deal with it) so there's an excuse to get Nato fully involved. I can't imagine its a unanimous decision not to. I hope they don't succeed
Ukraine absolutely, and desperately wants NATO involvement, if nothing else to strengthen their hand at the conference table. I am more skeptical about the Polish, Czech and Slovenian governments. Poland has every reason to want the strongest possible NATO commitment to defend NATO territory, and to escalate short of WMD exchange as a consequence. That's the hand that they've been playing up until now, though I don't know how committed they are to that approach. The Czechs and Slovenians have a better dirt situation, and I have a hard time seeing them as provocateurs. Someone like @Bruce Wayne might be able to weigh in on the situation on the ground in Czechia, and prove me wrong at least in terms of the immediate politics.

but why would a long term separatist conflict suit his aims in Georgia but not Ukraine?
and why would he think he could easily take the whole of Ukraine but not Georgia?
and what are the different strategic objectives?

As far as I can see they are two nearly identical situations and the big difference seems to be passion. Putin wants all of Ukraine because he sees it as fundamental to the Russian empire. Georgia, not so much.
The fact that he's gone all out here and not in Georgia, for me, negates his argument about NATO and security. He could have had the exact same strategic outcome but instead he went all in.
He didn't end up with a long-term separatist conflict in Georgia, though. He forced Georgia to accede to letting go of his sympathizers and walked. He more easily could have taken much of Georgia if he really wanted. I wouldn't have wanted to pacify an insurgency there either, though. Trying to dig insurgents out of the Caucasus is just asking for trouble. See: eastern Afghanistan and its own mountain range that the British, Soviets and United States all broke their teeth on.

In the case of Ukraine, the dirt is more favorable from an attacker's perspective but they have 10x the people. This necessitates a lot more boots to pacify an insurgency, and other posters have highlighted some of the evidence from over the years that despite internal divisions, the Ukrainians respond strongly to threats to their identity and circle up the wagons when those threats occur. Sure, some of that evidence might be a clip from Seinfeld, but the clip is believable (and funny), which is the point. If the clip weren't believable, it would tell us something about who they are.

What Putin probably wants in Ukrainian politics is influence, more than the dirt. Reality is that Ukraine has made a decent chunk of Russian natural gas exports from pipelines crossing their territory vanish over the years. The dirt would also be as good as it gets from the perspective of NATO launching disabling counterforce missile strikes against his land-based forces. From his perspective, these are the threats.

The narrative seems to be that Putin went into Ukraine whole-hog because of the cultural linkages, and thought that he would be welcomed with open arms, but I think that's wrong. I think he went in as hard as he did because of the stakes. I don't think he expected to be welcomed, but I also think he believed he could project more hard power than it turned out he could. I think he expected to roll up the dirt east of the Dnieper fairly easily, and produce a failed state incapable of joining NATO while driving a hard bargain for peace.

You are, of course, welcome to dispute the non-factual portions of that argument. It's my assessment. It doesn't mean I'm right. I'm no expert on Ukrainian or Russian politics. I know an awful lot about the system more broadly, but I won't presume to claim area specialty. To use a poker analogy, I can put Putin on a range based on the available information. I can't necessarily put him on a hand.
 
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