Current Affairs Ukraine
- Thread starter Mutzo Nutzo
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Yup, he has made a big mistake in here. There’s a time and a place for wumming - but this thread isn’t it.
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Runub
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Explosive orgasm
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The apparent Russian failure to establish a cohesive command structure among forces defending on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast continues to degrade Russian morale and combat capabilities. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 29 that elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) operating near Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River) are refusing to conduct assaults on Ukrainian positions due to a lack of artillery coordination, tactical intelligence transmission, and proper communication about the location of Russian minefields.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that maps of the Russian minefields are classified and that Russian commanders have not properly coordinated with assault units about the locations of these minefields, leading to 50 casualties among elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade in the last month.[2] Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry brigade arrived in the Krynky area in early October 2023 and appear to have taken over responsibility for the immediate Krynky area from elements of the newly created 18th Combined Arms Army (CAA) following the start of Ukrainian ground operations on the east bank of the Dnipro in mid-October 2023.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the 18th CAA’s 28th Motorized Rifle Regiment is currently operating in Pishchanivka (14km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River).[4] Additional elements of the 18th CAA and the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly hold positions in near rear areas on the east bank, and the joint command of these formations is likely overseeing much of the current Russian response to the Ukrainian ground operations on the east bank.[5] The reported minefield incident suggests that the command of the 18th CAA did not share relevant tactical details with the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade’s command, suggesting that higher-level Russian commanders responsible for the defense of the east bank have yet to remedy this failure in coordination.
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The Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces is increasingly comprised of disparate elements of recently transferred and degraded units and new formations, which may be contributing to this apparent lack of cohesive command structure. Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade and 177th Naval Infantry Brigade (Caspian Flotilla) transferred to the Kherson direction likely after sustaining heavy casualties defending against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in western Zaporizhia Oblast in the summer of 2023.[6] The majority of the 7th VDV Division’s combat elements are currently still defending in western Zaporizhia Oblast, although the 7th VDV’s 171st Air Assault Battalion (97th VDV Regiment) and 104th Separate Tank Battalion are reportedly operating on the east bank of Kherson Oblast.[7] Elements of the 49th CAA (Southern Military District) have reportedly been operating in the Kherson direction since the Ukrainian liberation of Kherson City in November 2022, but some Russian and Ukrainian sources claim that the Russian command has since redeployed elements of at least one of its brigades to the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[8] The newly created 18th CAA’s 70th Motorized Rifle Division and 22nd Army Corps (formerly of the Black Sea Fleet) are operating on the east bank.[9] Elements of the newly created 104th VDV Division’s 328th VDV Regiment are reportedly defending in the Krynky area, and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that additional elements of the 104th VDV Division are currently deploying to the Kherson direction.[10] ISW previously observed elements of the 80th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) operating on the left bank in July 2023, and November 28 reports of 14th Army Corps Deputy Commander Major General Vladimir Zavadsky’s death in the Kherson direction suggests that these elements may still be in the area.[11] Elements of the 41st CAA (Central Military District) reportedly transferred from the Kupyansk direction to Kherson Oblast in early October and may be defending on the east bank.[12]
The Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces, therefore, appears to be comprised of elements of the Black Sea Fleet, the Caspian Flotilla, the Southern Military District, the Central Military District, the Northern Fleet, and the VDV. Russia’s other grouping of forces in Ukraine largely correspond with Russia’s military districts reinforced in some cases with VDV units, making the “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces a notable aberration. The unnamed force grouping in charge of the Russian defense in western Zaporizhia Oblast is primarily comprised of elements of the 58th CAA (Southern Military District) reinforced with elements of several VDV regiments but has not suffered any of the apparent coordination issues that the “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces has faced. The Russian military command should be able to form groupings of forces interchangeably between formations from different military districts and combined arms armies. Persistent Russian issues with sharing situational awareness between units and creating common operating pictures and coherent command structures throughout Ukraine have likely incentivized the creation of groupings of forces comprised of formations and units largely from the same military districts as mitigations.[13] The recent arrival of likely degraded, understaffed, and undertrained Russian elements to the Kherson direction and their immediate commitment to defensive operations has likely further complicated Russian efforts to create a coherent command structure for the disparate elements of the “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces.[14] The Russian military command appointed VDV Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky as Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces Commander on October 29, 2023, and one of Teplinsky’s main objectives is likely to establish a more unified command for the grouping.[15] The Russian military command is unlikely to remedy the “Dnepr” Grouping of Force’s command issues in the short term, however, and the continuation of Ukrainian ground operations on the left bank will likely only complicate these efforts. It is not yet clear if the command-and-control challenges facing Russian forces in Kherson will generate notable battlefield effects
www.understandingwar.org
The Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces, therefore, appears to be comprised of elements of the Black Sea Fleet, the Caspian Flotilla, the Southern Military District, the Central Military District, the Northern Fleet, and the VDV. Russia’s other grouping of forces in Ukraine largely correspond with Russia’s military districts reinforced in some cases with VDV units, making the “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces a notable aberration. The unnamed force grouping in charge of the Russian defense in western Zaporizhia Oblast is primarily comprised of elements of the 58th CAA (Southern Military District) reinforced with elements of several VDV regiments but has not suffered any of the apparent coordination issues that the “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces has faced. The Russian military command should be able to form groupings of forces interchangeably between formations from different military districts and combined arms armies. Persistent Russian issues with sharing situational awareness between units and creating common operating pictures and coherent command structures throughout Ukraine have likely incentivized the creation of groupings of forces comprised of formations and units largely from the same military districts as mitigations.[13] The recent arrival of likely degraded, understaffed, and undertrained Russian elements to the Kherson direction and their immediate commitment to defensive operations has likely further complicated Russian efforts to create a coherent command structure for the disparate elements of the “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces.[14] The Russian military command appointed VDV Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky as Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces Commander on October 29, 2023, and one of Teplinsky’s main objectives is likely to establish a more unified command for the grouping.[15] The Russian military command is unlikely to remedy the “Dnepr” Grouping of Force’s command issues in the short term, however, and the continuation of Ukrainian ground operations on the left bank will likely only complicate these efforts. It is not yet clear if the command-and-control challenges facing Russian forces in Kherson will generate notable battlefield effects
Institute for the Study of War
The apparent Russian failure to establish a cohesive command structure among forces defending on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast continues to degrade Russian morale and combat capabilities. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 29 that
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Russia's efforts to generate combat power via recruitment from Central Asian countries may become a source of tension in Russia's relationship with its Central Asian neighbors. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)'s Central Asian service Radio Azattyk reported on November 28 that a Kazakh court sentenced Kazakh citizen Alexei Shompolov to six years and eight months in prison on charges of mercenarism.[40] Shompolov reportedly fought in a Wagner Group artillery unit near Bakhmut.[41] Shompolov's case represents the second charge of mercenarism pursued by a Central Asian country against a combatant who fought for Russia in Ukraine—an Uzbek court similarly sentenced an Uzbek man who fought with Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) troops in Ukraine in 2014–2015 on October 31.[42] Russian milbloggers responded to Shompolov's sentencing by criticizing Kazakh leadership for taking an "anti-Russian" stance and questioned if Kazakh authorities would similarly charge Kazakh citizens who fought in the Ukrainian army.[43] Russia's continued insistence on leveraging Central Asian populations for force-generation purposes, both within Central Asian countries and in Central Asian migrant communities in Russia itself, is likely to create friction between Russia and its neighbors as Central Asian countries use mercenarism laws to punish residents who fought for Russia.[44
Spadge Vernacular
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Russia fumes at the West's charm offensive in its backyard, saying it's 'luring' its friends away
Russia is likely to be watching closely as Western nations try to build alliances in what has traditionally been seen as its "backyard" and sphere of influence.
davek
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Brussels threatens Poland with lawsuit over blockade at Ukraine border
The European Commission has harshly denounced the blockade at the Ukrainian border instigated by Polish truckers and farmers, threatening legal action against the government in Warsaw. #EuropeNews
www.euronews.com
Slovaks ready to start a blockade on their border too.
Drico
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I see the Ukrainians - Yermak and Kuleba - are lauding the war criminal Kissinger. Putin, too. How ironic.
What it tells me is I don't share the "values" of the Russians OR the Ukrainians, which is what I suspected all along despite the unforgivable behaviour of Russia in this war.
What it tells me is I don't share the "values" of the Russians OR the Ukrainians, which is what I suspected all along despite the unforgivable behaviour of Russia in this war.
Drico
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More double-standards from the Poles. Western European hauliers complained bitterly about how they were undercut by Polish and other eastern European hauliers when they joined the single market in 2004. What goes around comes around. The Poles are great lads at telling the Germans and French to shut up moaning and cough up when it comes to sanctioning Russia and supporting Ukraine, but scream like piglets when they have to feel the pain themselves. Their solidarity is every bit as self-serving as anybody else's, but their piety is world class.Brussels threatens Poland with lawsuit over blockade at Ukraine border
The European Commission has harshly denounced the blockade at the Ukrainian border instigated by Polish truckers and farmers, threatening legal action against the government in Warsaw. #EuropeNews
Slovaks ready to start a blockade on their border too.
davek
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Well, it's not just Poles. Hungary have done this too and Slovakia are next up.
Ukraine is such a super power in agriculture that allowing them to flood the EU market will have all of their nation states up in arms.
Drico
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Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia: what could they possibly have in common?
All three are currently cuckoos in the EU nest destabilising us from within. The Polish electorate realised, belatedly, that they needed to change course if they weren't to jeopardise their membership and Donald Tusk can't come back soon enough.
The Polish truckers are complaining right now in exactly the same way that Western European truckers did when the Poles joined in 2004. They had to suck it up then - and the Poles, Hungarians, and Slovaks will have to do so now.
Hungary is about to become very isolated indeed in the EU, now that Tusk is incoming, and Slovakia is simply too small to matter.
As for Ukraine joining the EU - that's decades away for some very good reasons indeed. But what we are seeing right now is self-serving squealing by pigs who thought nothing of demanding the Germans, for example, pay through the nose to dump Russian energy in the blink of an eye. The Germans did that - amazingly - despite the pain. They won't be taking lectures from these two-faced chancers now that the boot is on the other foot.
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