I think I've posted this before but Peter Turchin studies history using mathematical models. He looks at various past instances of near-societal collapse (French Revolution, US Civil War, Russian Revolution, Ming-Qing transition, etc. etc.) and finds which variables are common; he then looks at which societies have combinations of these variables to project future collapse. Historians tend to hate him as they think history has too many particulars to be used to predict "future history" so to speak. I think it is an interesting approach. Note: one of the predictors of political instability is the overproduction of elites, in one case measured as folks with a 4-year Uni degree (bachelor's degree) but in other analyses it is simply the number of folks who have some expectation of privilege and notoriety--he claims this is particularly problematic when there are too many "elites" vying for political power--they come into conflict with each other and vie for attention by doing/saying outlandish things. A lot of this is documented in his most recent book "End Times." He's not trying to be doom-n-gloom, rather, because he focuses on societal collapse, his research won't have much of a positive outlook.
He wrote this in 2010 and it is not too far off the mark for the USA, given the insurrection...
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I received Turchin's book for Christmas. It's quite dry and took me a while but it's hard not to look back through history and see the cycles pretty much everywhere.
His theory can pretty much be summed up in 3 "laws":
1 - Stable societies with growing economies will see inequality grow as societal elites (defined as those with some measure of influence over others) use that power & influence to hoover up eve greater percentages of the resources available
2 - As the numbers in poverty grow due to the worsening inequality, larger sections of the population become desparate for change and are able to be mobilised for causes
3 - With more cash floating around at the top, too many elites are vying for the same amount of potential influence over society (either political or financial power). This leads to conflict amongst elites which can spill over into violence, using the mobilised masses defined in point 2
Turchin posits this is a fundamental process of human societies and only the rate it which it happens varies, based on factors such as polygamy vs monogamy. He does cite several examples of societies that were able to delay their 'destabilisation periods' - Britain in the 19th century is one such, as it was able to send surplus elites out to run or pillage the Empire. 19th century Russia too, which freed the serfs - this then led to political destabilisation in the following decades, several revolutions, and eventually the USSR.
Really though, the only way to arrest the cycle is for the elite class to agree en masse (via legislation & regulation) to not worsen inequality, as seen in the US from the 1930s to the 1970s. When these things were repealed in the 70s the cycle resumed and is now at 'breaking point'.
It's sombre stuff and globalisation has probably synchronised all our cycles to that of our nearest & most influential world power.
