tsubaki
Player Valuation: £90m
I'm not going to say that some of what you're saying is not true because it is, however I would argue that you are quite overtly overstating it for whatever reason.
The four primary reasons for appeasement were:
Like I said earlier, with hindsight it is quite easy to place the blame on certain people, classes or parties even though in reality it is far from that simple or linear.
- A desire to prevent war because of memories of the slaughter in 1914-1918,
- Early on, a fairly large consensus within the population that Versailles had been too extensive in its punishment and this was a natural correction,
- Financially, an Empire that was already overstretched and simply couldn't in the short-term afford to counter German by a military rearmament programme,
- Significant deficiencies in military strategy: Belgian neutrality in 1937 et al.
The Tory party cannot be exempt from blame, far from it, but in reality some of the arguments here come across as subjective and as political point scoring.
This is the substance of the revisionist stance over appeasement, but there is an awful lot questionable with it:
A desire to prevent war because of memories of the slaughter in 1914-1918 - this is the basis of much of the argument, but it would probably be more correct to say "a desire to prevent war because of what the government thought happened in 1914-18". One of the remarkable things about the appeasement government was that many of the senior ministers hadn't actually fought in the first world war. Chamberlain didn't, neither did Hoare or Hailsham, Hore-Belisha was in the RASC and although Halifax did serve at the front line he was an MP at the time and was largely kept out of the way. Of the senior ministers, only Eden had a creditable record in the first war - and he resigned. There was a contrast with the pre-war anti-appeasment crowd, most of whom had war experience and those too young to have served went on to serve in the second war (where some were killed).
People did not want a war, and the government strove really, really hard to make sure they didn't - using its control of society and much of the media to drive home how horrible it was going to be, how reckless the anti-appeasement crowd were ("warmonger" was often used as a slur), how many people were going to die if war started. The fact that people also wanted Hitler stopped was forgotten, sacrificed so that there wouldn't be a conflict. Obviously this failed.
Early on, a fairly large consensus within the population that Versailles had been too extensive in its punishment and this was a natural correction - this is an argument that was made at the time, often by the people who had sympathy with what they thought the Nazi regime was about (nationalist, anti-communist). Versailles as a treaty was, when viewed against 1945 and what the Germans had done in 1871 (and to the Russians in 1917), remarkably lenient given that Germany had started the war, repeatedly breached international law even as it existed at the time and most importantly had lost the war on the battlefield. They had killed hundreds of thousands of British men, tens of thousands of British civilians, used chemical weapons, ruined most of north-eastern France and bombed London repeatedly.
Financially, an Empire that was already overstretched and simply couldn't in the short-term afford to counter German by a military rearmament programme - this is wrong on two counts. Firstly, its largely based on a myth that developed after the German victories of 1939-40 about the Wehrmacht being invincible, which was probably brought about by the people who had created the circumstances for those victories to take place to try and avoid the blame for their inaction. Germany between 1935 and 1940 had fewer tanks (with less armour and weaker guns) than the French and the British, less artillery, less fortified areas and fewer men. Rearmament had not been given the priority that it deserved (and they could definately have done a lot more than they did), but it should have been enough even with that handicap to not lose as terribly as they did in 1940. Of course, the Germans steamrollered everyone in 1940 because despite their equipment handicaps they had worked out a way of fighting - ironically largely based on British theory and practice - whilst everyone else hadn't. The failure of the British in particular to develop an equivalent was unforgiveable, given they'd had a couple of decades head start, and this is something that can firmly be laid at the door of the government.
Secondly, German rearmament came from a really low base (almost nothing in the case of the air and sea, and only slighly more in terms of the land forces). Up until 1939 (and probably until the invasion of the Soviet Union) the Germans were (in quantative terms) behind the Allies.
Significant deficiencies in military strategy: Belgian neutrality in 1937 et al - that really isn't an argument that could be used to defend the then government's policy though; the deficiencies in strategy are their deficiencies.